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SCOTT DODSON*
Personal Jurisdiction in Comparative Context†
This Article places the recent evolution of U.S. personal jurisdiction 
in comparative context. Comparativism helps illuminate and explain 
both the modest convergences and the more pervasive divergences. On 
the convergences side, the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of trans-
national litigation and express invocation of European approaches to 
personal jurisdiction have helped move general jurisdiction away from 
the exorbitant “doing business” jurisdiction that seemed previously to 
be settled U.S. law. But persistent divergences tell the more interesting 
story. The Court’s refusal to deviate from its commitment to transient 
jurisdiction, its recent narrowing of specific jurisdiction since 2011, its 
implicit rejection of pendent-party personal jurisdiction, and its adher-
ence to a strong form of consent-based personal jurisdiction all reveal 
a stark contrast with other countries’ approaches to personal jurisdic-
tion. That contrast is founded on deep and stubborn ties to American 
history, political structure, and litigation norms, all of which make 
broader convergence difficult, if not implausible. For these reasons, 
U.S. personal-jurisdiction doctrine is more likely to continue to develop 
on an independent track rather than hew to global trends. Some areas 
of parallelism might still occur, but substantial convergence is likely to 
remain elusive.
IntroductIon
In the United States, personal jurisdiction—known elsewhere as 
part of “jurisdiction to adjudicate”—is the power of a court to enter a 
binding judgment governing the rights and obligations of the parties 
in a case. In a world of many sovereigns and many courts, personal 
jurisdiction helps determine which sovereign’s courts can hear a case, 
and that determination is influenced by the nature of the parties and 
their connections to the forum.
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The United States treats personal jurisdiction as domestic law1: 
each sovereign can set its own rules. Those rules begin with constitu-
tional and statutory prescriptions of U.S. personal jurisdiction, but the 
codifications are open ended and vague, so the work developing the 
doctrine has fallen primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, in the 
United States, the Court’s opinions set the justification and scope for 
personal jurisdiction.
Those opinions largely have attended to U.S. doctrine without re-
gard to the law of judicial jurisdiction in other countries. Instead, the 
Court has looked to features unique to the American experience: inter-
state federalism,2 constitutional due process, court precedent, and the 
tug of history. That grounding formed a doctrine of personal jurisdic-
tion that was, for many years, rather exceptional when compared to 
foreign norms and trends.
In the last few years, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
refocused on personal jurisdiction and has handed down a flurry of 
decisions that reveal a new evolution in the doctrine. There is some 
indication in those recent decisions that the Court is paying closer 
attention to how other countries structure jurisdiction to adjudicate, 
and how the reach of U.S. courts could affect the interests of foreign 
countries. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in particular, has tried to 
steer U.S. doctrine more in line with the scope of personal jurisdic-
tion elsewhere, and, at least with respect to general jurisdiction, she 
has largely succeeded.3 But in other contexts, American personal jur-
isdiction remains stubbornly exceptional. And even the Court’s recent 
effort to move general jurisdiction toward restrictions common in the 
rest of the world has resulted, perhaps ironically, in a rigidity that cre-
ates new tensions with the laws of other countries.
This Article places the recent evolution of U.S. personal jurisdic-
tion in comparative context. Comparativism helps illuminate and 
explain both the modest convergences and the more pervasive di-
vergences. On the convergences side, the justices’ own international 
travel, acknowledgment of transnational litigation, and express invo-
cation of European approaches to personal jurisdiction have helped 
move general jurisdiction away from the exorbitant “doing business” 
jurisdiction that seemed previously to be settled U.S. law. That move-
ment overcomes a major obstacle to U.S. participation in international 
 1. Cf. restatement (Fourth) oF ForeIgn relatIons law § 422 (am. law Inst. 
2018) (Reporters’ Note 11) (“This Section restates rules of personal jurisdiction exclu-
sively as domestic law of the United States.”).
 2. Interstate federalism, often also called horizontal federalism, refers to the 
relationships among the states of the United States, as opposed to the relationship of 
the states to the national government.
 3. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014) (noting consistency be-
tween the new test for general jurisdiction and the scope of jurisdiction in other coun-
tries). See also J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909 & n.16 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the conflict between the case result and the personal 
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agreements on judgment recognition that may now be back on the 
table.4 Personal jurisdiction, in many ways, is about inter-sovereign 
relationships, and, at the very least, the recent trends suggest that the 
Court is taking those relationships seriously.
But the persistent divergences tell the more interesting story. 
The Court’s refusal to deviate from its commitment to transient jur-
isdiction, its narrowing of specific jurisdiction, its implicit rejection of 
pendent-party personal jurisdiction, and its adherence to a strong form 
of consent-based personal jurisdiction all reveal a stark contrast with 
other countries’ approaches to personal jurisdiction. That contrast is 
founded on deep-seated ties to American history, political structure, 
and litigation norms, all of which make broader convergence difficult, 
if not implausible. At the same time, the new cases reveal a doctrine 
still in search of a rationale, and the unsettled moorings means that 
U.S. personal jurisdiction is likely to drift in unpredictable ways in the 
near term.
For these reasons, U.S. personal-jurisdiction doctrine, as molded 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, is more likely to continue to develop on an 
independent track rather than hew to foreign trends. Some areas of 
parallelism might still occur, but substantial convergence is likely to 
remain elusive.
I. Personal JurIsdIctIon In the unIted states
This Part sets out the U.S. law on personal jurisdiction. It starts 
with some foundational principles, then lays out the law prior to the 
new wave of cases that began in 2011, and concludes with the post-
2011 changes.
A. Foundational Principles
Two key attributes of the United States have influenced U.S. per-
sonal jurisdiction in distinctive ways. The first is the federal structure 
of the United States, which exhibits both national sovereignty and 
independent state sovereignty. Because state courts are creatures of 
their own state and not of other states or of the United States gov-
ernment, the personal jurisdiction of state courts is limited by the 
sovereign interests of sister states. This federal structure influences 
U.S. personal jurisdiction in a number of ways. Most importantly, it 
glosses U.S. personal jurisdiction with the need to protect interstate 
harmony. Although federal courts arguably do not have to worry 
about interstate friction because they are beholden to the national 
 4. One possibility is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (July 2, 2019), www.hcch.net/
en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137 (not yet in force) [hereinafter 2019 
Judgments Convention]. Although the 2019 Judgments Convention focuses on jurisdic-
tion only indirectly, as part of judgment recognition and enforcement, the Judgments 
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sovereign rather than any one state, the scope of personal jurisdiction 
in state court and in federal court are roughly equivalent. For state 
courts, the Constitution ties personal jurisdiction to the particular 
state’s personal-jurisdiction reach.5 For federal courts, although the 
Constitution ties personal jurisdiction to the personal-jurisdiction 
reach of the United States as a whole, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure typically peg the personal-jurisdiction reach of a federal 
court to the same scope as that applicable to a state court.6 The re-
sult is that the purely domestic concern of interstate federalism has 
played a significant role in the development of the doctrine.
The second attribute is the protection, in the U.S. Constitution, of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of “due process,”7 
which the Supreme Court has identified as the source of the consti-
tutional limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction.8 Importantly, 
the Constitution sets an outer reach of adjudicatory authority; the 
particular court’s sovereign can further restrict that reach by statute 
or rule, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do, for example, for 
federal courts. Because the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses do not 
distinguish between domestic and foreign parties, nor do most statu-
tory or rule-based authorizations of jurisdiction to adjudicate, U.S. law 
of personal jurisdiction typically does not distinguish between do-
mestic and foreign defendants, though the distinction does play a role 
in application of the doctrine.9
With these two attributes in mind, the next subsections provide 
an account of the development of U.S. personal jurisdiction.
B. Personal Jurisdiction Prior to 2011
Until the mid-1900s, a state court’s personal jurisdiction, absent 
consent or waiver, was typically limited to parties residing in or served 
within the court’s state.10 That presence-based concept was tested by 
 5. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires 
a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”).
 6. See Fed. r. cIv. P. 4(k)(1). There are some deviations from this general rule of 
federal law. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 
117 mIch. l. rev. 1463, 1474 n.67 (2019) (listing statutory grants of nationwide 
service).
 7. u.s. const. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
 8. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702–03 n.10 (1982).
 9. A foreign defendant, for example, is far more likely than a domestic defendant 
to convince a court that a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was fundamentally 
unfair. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 
mIch. l. rev. 1205, 1214–15 (2018). See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 480 
U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) (recognizing the “unique burdens placed upon one who must 
defendant oneself in a foreign legal system”).
 10. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tri-
bunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is es-
tablished.”); id. at 722 (“[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over 
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the rise of corporations and interstate activities, and, in 1945, the 
Supreme Court decided the path-marking case of International Shoe v. 
Washington, which added a new way for a state court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident who was not served in the forum 
state: when the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the 
forum state such that “the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.”11 International Shoe and its progeny 
indicated that personal jurisdiction serves two interests: protecting 
the individual litigant’s right to be free from the burdens of litigating 
afar, and an interstate federalism interest in keeping the states from 
infringing on each other’s sovereignty.12 International Shoe also ush-
ered in a new kind of personal-jurisdiction doctrine founded on stand-
ards and balancing tests rather than rules.13
Today, the Supreme Court recognizes four discrete bases for per-
sonal jurisdiction under the Constitution. First, a state always has jur-
isdiction over its residents even when they are out of state when sued.14 
Second, a state has jurisdiction over a nonresident if the nonresident 
consents to jurisdiction, either by ex ante contract or by ex post waiver 
or forfeiture of jurisdictional objections.15 Third, a state has personal jur-
isdiction over an individual nonresident who is personally served while 
in the forum state (so-called tag or transient jurisdiction).16 Fourth, a 
state has jurisdiction over a nonresident when the nonresident’s con-
tacts meet the “minimum contacts” test of International Shoe.
This fourth basis for personal jurisdiction—minimum contacts—
is further divided into two species.17 The first species—“specific 
 11. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
 12. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
 13. See Alexandra Lahav, The New Privity 17 (July 2, 2019) (unpublished manu-
script), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3413349.
 14. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
 15. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (ex ante consent); 
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1983) (plaintiff consent by initiating the case in 
the court); Fed. r. cIv. P. 12(h) (waiver and forfeiture).
 16. See Burnham v. Sup. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Prior to Burnham, some com-
mentators and courts inferred an International Shoe reasonableness check on tran-
sient jurisdiction. See, e.g., restatement (second) oF conFlIct oF laws § 28 (am. law Inst. 
rev. ed. 1988) (“A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual 
who is present within its territory unless the individual’s relationship to the state is 
so attenuated as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.”). Although 
Burnham does not resolve whether the exercise of transient jurisdiction is subject to 
a reasonableness analysis, Burnham makes clear that any reasonableness check is de 
minimis. Compare Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion) (“[J]urisdiction based 
on physical presence alone constitutes due process.”), with id. at 639 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[A]s a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based 
on his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due process.”). 
See also restatement (Fourth) oF ForeIgn relatIons law § 422 cmt. c (am. law Inst. 
2018) (“General jurisdiction also exists if the defendant is a natural person and has 
been personally served with process within the forum.”).
 17. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 nw. u. l. rev. 1, 
17 (2018). The U.S. terms “specific jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” are not com-
monly used in other countries, but they are grounded in a division between claim-based 
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jurisdiction”—applies when the defendant’s minimum contacts with 
the forum state give rise to or are related to the cause of action. Under 
specific jurisdiction, even a single contact with the forum state can 
justify personal jurisdiction, if the contact is significant enough that 
it would be fair and reasonable for the forum state to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction. A key example is Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,18 
which allowed a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonres-
ident whose only connections to the forum state were encompassed in 
the contract that was the subject of the cause of action. Burger King 
also noted that personal jurisdiction encompassed five “fairness fac-
tors,” which could raise or lower the minimum level of contacts needed 
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, though the Court re-
mained vague how that interaction would work in practice.19
Up through the 1980s, the development of specific jurisdiction 
was episodic and thus difficult to synthesize into a coherent whole. For 
example, although the Court offered some guidance about what quali-
tative contacts were meaningful,20 the Court left open how direct a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state had to be21 and how related 
to the cause of action the defendant’s contacts had to be.22 Further, the 
Court seemed to suggest that the plaintiff ’s connection to the forum 
state could be meaningful.23 Still, the standards produced workable 
guidance for the lower courts, which, over time, applied them fairly 
consistently in ways that mimicked rules. For example, the state 
courts developed (and the Supreme Court later endorsed) a rule that 
the minimum-contacts test subjected manufacturers to personal jur-
isdiction wherever their products caused injury, if the distribution of 
their products to that state was foreseeable.24
The second species of “minimum contacts” is called “general jur-
isdiction” and applies to nonresidents who are sued in a state for 
a cause of action unrelated to the nonresident’s contacts with the 
 18. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
 19. Id. The five fairness factors are the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff ’s 
interest in obtaining effective relief, the interest of the forum state, the policies of 
other states or nations, and the judicial system’s interest in efficiency. See Asahi Metal 
Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987).
 20. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (identifying con-
tacts that reap “the benefits and protections of the laws of that state”).
 21. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102.
 22. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
 23. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1984).
 24. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) 
(“The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it as-
serts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream 
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the 
forum State.”). E.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 
766 (Ill. 1961); Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 106 S.E.2d 704 (N.C. 1959); Nixon v. Cohn, 
385 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1963); O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 194 A.2d 568 (Vt. 1963); 
Andersen v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965); Marathon Battery 
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state.25 General jurisdiction requires significantly more contacts than 
specific jurisdiction. Until 2011, general jurisdiction was understood 
to require “continuous and systematic” contacts,26 a formulation that 
might subject large businesses with significant operations in all fifty 
states (like, say, McDonald’s) to general jurisdiction in any state for 
any cause of action.27 Some lower courts and commentators even 
equated general jurisdiction with “doing business” jurisdiction, which 
would subject defendants to general jurisdiction anywhere they did 
business, even if the suit arose for reasons other than the business 
conducted in that state.28
During this time, the Court appeared to settle on an underlying 
theory of “minimum contacts” jurisdiction as primarily a due process 
right based on fairness and reasonableness, rather than as a compo-
nent of interstate federalism and sovereign limits.29 Because personal 
jurisdiction has features of an individual right, personal jurisdiction 
is a defendant-by-defendant inquiry, with constitutional standards 
 25. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–17. See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 
(stating that “continuous corporation operations within a state [can be] so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from deal-
ings entirely distinct from those activities”).
 26. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the language had been “taught to generations of first-year law stu-
dents”); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 tex. l. rev. 
721, 767 (1988) (“Courts currently measure the sufficiency of unrelated business con-
tacts between the forum state and the defendant with the continuous and systematic 
test.”). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which was drafted shortly after 
the original general-jurisdiction case of Perkins v. Benguet, 342 U.S. 437 (1952), pro-
vides a slightly different formulation that does not account for subsequent general-
jurisdiction gloss: “A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation which does business in the state with respect to causes of action that do not 
arise from the business done in the state if this business is so continuous and substan-
tial as to make it reasonable for the state to exercise such jurisdiction.” restatement 
(second) oF conFlIct oF laws § 47(2) (am. law Inst. 1971). See also id. § 47 cmt. e (citing 
to Perkins).
 27. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 Fordham l. rev. 73, 75 
(2018). The United States distinguishes personal jurisdiction from venue, which is 
a statutory mechanism designed to select the proper set of courts within a judicial 
system based on convenience and efficiency. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Thus, although 
a broad formulation of general jurisdiction might allow the exercise of personal juris-
diction over McDonald’s in any state, venue directives might limit the range of proper 
federal courts to just one or two federal districts.
 28. See Meir Ferer, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business 
Jurisdiction, 63 S.c. l. rev. 671, 675 (2012) (“[L]ower courts widely embraced the no-
tion that any corporation ‘doing business’ in a state was subject to general jurisdic-
tion there.”). For critiques of doing business jurisdiction, see Patrick J. Borchers, The 
Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 u. chI. legal F. 119; Mary Twitchell, Why We 
Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 u. chI. legal F. 171.
 29. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual 
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sov-
ereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”); id. at 702 n.10 (“The restriction on 
sovereign power described in [prior cases] . . . must be seen as ultimately a function of 
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the 
only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no 
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applicable as to each defendant.30 Thus, U.S. courts have not adopted 
a pendent-jurisdiction doctrine that would allow personal jurisdiction 
over one defendant simply because the forum had personal jurisdic-
tion over another defendant on a related claim in the same action.31 
However, some lower federal courts adopted a doctrine of pendent 
personal jurisdiction over joined related claims against the same de-
fendant.32 The rationale was that once the defendant is properly before 
the court on one claim, there was no unfairness or unreasonableness 
in having the court adjudicate all other related claims against that 
defendant, even if the court would lack personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant based on those related claims alone.33
C. Personal Jurisdiction After 2011
U.S. law has not deviated from its adherence to transient jurisdic-
tion34 or to its understanding that parties can establish personal jur-
isdiction by consent or waiver. However, starting in 2011, the Supreme 
Court began to restrict other facets of personal jurisdiction.35 The 
Court decided a series of six cases—three on specific jurisdiction and 
three on general jurisdiction—that dramatically narrowed both spe-
cies of “minimum contacts” jurisdiction over nonresidents.
The first in the specific jurisdiction line is J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro.36 There, a New Jersey resident, injured in New Jersey 
by a metal-shearing machine, sued the machine’s British manufac-
turer in New Jersey state court.37 The manufacturer contracted with 
an American distributor (who was not sued) to sell machines in the 
United States, but the manufacturer did not specifically target New 
Jersey. The facts accepted by a majority of the justices indicated that 
just one of the machines entered New Jersey. Those two facts were 
dispositive for the Court. The plurality held that specific targeting 
of New Jersey was indispensable for New Jersey to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction, even when the manufacturer generally targeted 
the United States as a whole.38 The concurrence held that the lack 
of state-specific targeting, coupled with such a low number of prod-
ucts entering the forum state, was sufficient to deny jurisdiction.39 
The dissent would have held that New Jersey’s exercise of personal 
 30. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
 31. U.S. rules do authorize a very limited form of pendent-party jurisdiction in 
federal court. See Fed. r. cIv. P. 4(k)(1)(B) (authorizing personal jurisdiction over de-
fendants joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 if served within 100 miles of the forum 
courthouse).
 32. Dodson, supra note 17, at 21–22.
 33. Id.
 34. See supra text accompanying note 16.
 35. Dodson, supra note 17, at 5.
 36. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
 37. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
 38. Id. at 886–87.
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jurisdiction was reasonable based on the fact that the injury occurred 
there, that the manufacturer directly targeted the United States as a 
whole, and that even a single machine was a significant sale.40
Although Nicastro lacked a controlling opinion, the case makes 
two important moves. First, Nicastro unsettles the theory behind per-
sonal jurisdiction, which previously was grounded primarily in a due 
process right and in notions of fairness rather than in sovereignty or 
interstate federalism; four Nicastro justices would have held personal 
jurisdiction to be about consent to the adjudicatory authority of the 
sovereign; three would have held personal jurisdiction to be about the 
reasonableness of the sovereign’s exercise of adjudicatory authority; 
and two expressed skepticism of both positions.41 Second, Nicastro is 
controlling authority for the proposition that targeting of the United 
States in general, coupled with a single sale that causes harm in the 
United States, is not enough to confer specific jurisdiction in a state 
court. That authority means that a foreign manufacturer might be im-
mune from U.S. personal jurisdiction despite manufacturing a product 
for use in the United States that causes harm in the United States.
The next case in the specific jurisdiction line is Walden v. Fiore.42 
There, the question was whether the plaintiff ’s continuous harm suf-
fered in the forum state was a connection between the forum and the 
defendant sufficient to meet the minimum contacts test. The Court 
answered no: the defendant must directly create contacts with the 
forum state, and such contacts cannot arise solely because of the re-
lationship of the plaintiff to the forum state.43 Walden “necessitates 
a direct link between the defendant and the forum” and backs away 
from prior cases that appeared to place some weight on the plaintiff ’s 
location.44
In the third case, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court,45 plain-
tiffs from California and other states sued Bristol-Myers Squibb in 
California for injuries sustained in their home states. All claims were 
founded on the same theory of liability. Although California clearly 
had personal jurisdiction over the California plaintiffs’ claims for in-
jury sustained in California, the Court held that California did not 
have personal jurisdiction over the non-California claims because 
there was no connection between California and the non-California 
claims.46 The rationale was not fairness (for Bristol-Myers Squibb was 
already properly before a California court to defend the California 
claims) but rather interstate sovereignty: that California adjudication 
 40. Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
 41. Id. at 880–81 (plurality opinion); id. at 900–01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
 42. 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
 43. Id. at 284–85.
 44. Dodson, supra note 17, at 24.
 45. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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of non-California claims would infringe on the prerogatives of the 
states where those injuries occurred.47
Bristol-Myers Squibb thus makes two moves. First, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb requires a direct link between the defendant’s forum-related 
activities and the claim.48 This determination undermines the doc-
trine of pendent personal jurisdiction widely adopted in the lower fed-
eral courts, at least as applied to claims brought by different plaintiffs 
against a single defendant. Second, Bristol-Myers Squibb holds that 
interstate federalism and state sovereignty are important components 
of U.S. personal jurisdiction. This holding offers a new ground for re-
stricting an otherwise reasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction.
These three cases alter the law of specific jurisdiction. Today, spe-
cific jurisdiction requires a direct link between the forum and the de-
fendant and between the forum and the claim. Specific jurisdiction 
also requires more than causing harm in the forum state, and the 
plaintiff ’s connection to the forum state is irrelevant except to the 
extent that the plaintiff establishes a direct connection between the 
forum and the defendant. Finally, even if otherwise reasonable, prin-
ciples of interstate federalism and state sovereignty might restrict the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction.
A recent example of the new restrictions on specific jurisdiction 
is M.J. v. Ford Motor Co. There, a Missouri car owner’s daughter sued 
Ford when the car owner died from an accident allegedly caused by a 
Ford car’s defective steering wheel. The accident occurred in Missouri, 
and the suit was brought in a Missouri federal district court. Ford is a 
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. 
The facts showed that Ford sold the car in question to an independent 
dealership in Tennessee. It was unclear how the car got to Missouri, 
but, presumably, a consumer purchased it from the Tennessee deal-
ership and drove it to Missouri. The facts also showed that Ford had 
substantial business in Missouri, including maintaining offices and 
manufacturing plants in Missouri, selling thousands of cars directly 
in Missouri, and directly marketing cars similar to the car in question 
in Missouri. The district court dismissed for lack of personal juris-
diction over Ford, relying on Walden and Bristol-Myers Squibb, and 
reasoning as follows:
Here, the Vehicle was last distributed by Ford when it was 
sold to a dealership in Tennessee. There are no allegations 
that it ended up in Missouri by the acts of Ford, its agent, 
or its alter-ego. Because Ford did not commit particular acts 
connecting to the Vehicle, this forum, and this litigation, no 
specific personal jurisdiction over Ford exists in Missouri.49
 47. Dodson, supra note 17, at 27–28.
 48. Id. at 28.
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As this case makes clear, lower courts are finding a lack of specific 
jurisdiction even when the injury occurs in the forum state and the 
defendant has substantial and direct business with the forum state.
The Court’s restrictive turn in general jurisdiction began with 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in 2011.50 There, the 
Court replaced the commonly accepted standard of “continuous and 
systematic contacts” with contacts that were “so constant and perva-
sive” as to render the defendant “at home” in the state.51 “Paradigm” 
examples include the domicile of an individual and the place of incorp-
oration and principal place of business for a corporation.52 Daimler 
AG v. Bauman,53 decided three years later, affirmed Goodyear, made 
Goodyear’s “paradigm” examples presumptively exclusive, and em-
phasized that the “at home” test is comparative, in that the contacts 
with the state must be assessed in light of the contacts the defendant 
has with other states when determining where the defendant is “at 
home.”54 Finally, in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,55 the Court recon-
firmed its commitment to this new general jurisdiction framework.
These general-jurisdiction cases eliminate any vestige of “doing 
business” jurisdiction and essentially reduce general jurisdiction to a 
domicile test. No longer is McDonald’s subject to general jurisdiction 
in all fifty states; rather, it is subject to general jurisdiction only in 
two states: its state of incorporation and the state of its headquarters 
offices. For foreign defendants, even if they do substantial business in 
the United States, general jurisdiction likely does not exist at all.56
II. u.s. Personal JurIsdIctIon In a comParatIve context
This Part puts the U.S. law of personal jurisdiction in a compara-
tive context. It analyzes the lines of convergence and points of diver-
gence in the various manifestations of personal jurisdiction.
A. Transient Jurisdiction
The U.S. commitment to transient jurisdiction continues to 
be shared by only a handful of other countries, such as the United 
Kingdom. The EU and most other counties consider transient jurisdic-
tion to be exorbitant and will refuse to honor judgments based upon 
it.57 Nevertheless, the United States continues to adhere to transient 
 50. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
 51. Id. at 924.
 52. Id.
 53. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
 54. Id. at 122, 139–40 & nn.19–20.
 55. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
 56. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 9, at 1220 (“For alien defendants, . . . the 
likelihood is that no U.S. state will be able to exercise general jurisdiction.”).
 57. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century 
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jurisdiction, at least for individuals, reflecting a part of the doctrine 
that is deeply and stubbornly rooted in history and tradition.58
B. Consent to Jurisdiction
By contrast, the U.S. commitment to consent as a basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction—and particularly ex ante consent by contract—is 
shared with other countries, which largely recognize the ability of par-
ties to consent to a particular court’s authority to resolve the dispute.59 
However, while the United States adheres to a fairly broad notion of 
consent, other countries are more willing to impose limits on contract-
based consent to personal jurisdiction, particularly when suspected 
unequal bargaining power between the contracting parties exists. For 
example, the Brussels I Recast prevents ex ante contracts from super-
seding the jurisdictional provisions for consumer claims in ways that 
disadvantage the consumer.60 The 2019 Judgments Convention dis-
claims judgment recognition if the judgment was entered based on ex 
ante consent to jurisdiction and was against a consumer “in matters 
relating to a consumer contract” or against “an employee in matters 
relating to the employee’s contract of employment.”61 And the Choice 
of Court Convention excludes employment contracts and certain other 
specified claims from the otherwise presumptive jurisdiction in a con-
tractually selected court.62 Similarly, the domestic law of individual 
restatement (thIrd) oF ForeIgn relatIons law § 421 (am. law Inst. 1987) (acknow-
ledging that service of process on a person only transitorily in the territory of the 
state is not generally acceptable under international law). E.g., European Regulation 
No. 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 5, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 
[hereinafter Brussels I Recast] (restricting EU jurisdiction to other grounds). For more 
on exorbitant jurisdiction, see Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant 
Jurisdiction, 58 me. l. rev. 474 (2006).
 58. See Burbank, supra note 57, at 116.
 59. See, e.g., Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 19 (acknowledging the gen-
eral rule of consent); mInJI mInsohō [mInsohō] [c. cIv. Pro.] 1996, art. 3-8 (Japan) (al-
lowing waiver of the defense to personal jurisdiction); Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 
1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶¶ 3.1(6)–(7) (Eng.) (allowing parties to select English 
courts by contract). See also Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 5, 
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter Choice of Court Convention] (“The court or 
courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall 
have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies [absent specified 
exceptions] . . . .”). For a comprehensive discussion, see ronald a. Brand & Paul m. 
herruP, the 2005 hague conventIon on choIce oF court agreements: commentary and 
documents (2008).
 60. Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 19 (providing that no private contracts 
can supersede the consumer-claim provisions unless the contract arises after the dis-
pute, or allows the consumer more choice of where to sue, or which confers jurisdiction 
on the courts of a particular member state where both parties were “domiciled or ha-
bitually resident”).
 61. 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2). For such parties, the 
Judgments Convention allows judgment recognition if the judgment were entered 
based on consent addressed orally or in writing to the judgment-rendering court. Id.
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countries qualify consent to personal jurisdiction. Japan, for example, 
allows consent in consumer cases only where the consumer was domi-
ciled at the time of the consumer contract.63 In contrast to these more 
flexible, fairness-based notions of consent to jurisdiction, U.S. doctrine 
does not vary based on supposed unequal bargaining power or even 
the status of a contract as a contract of adhesion.64 This manifestation 
of U.S. doctrine is grounded in party autonomy and litigation predict-
ability rather than in the fairness of the forum selected.
C. Specific Jurisdiction
Although the U.S. formulation of “minimum contacts” reflects a 
highly fact-dependent and standards-based inquiry, specific jurisdic-
tion once seemed, as illustrated by the rule that manufacturers gen-
erally are subject to personal jurisdiction where their products cause 
injury,65 to produce results in line with the more rule-based codifica-
tions found in other countries. As Linda Silberman has noted, “the 
place of injury is a well-accepted jurisdictional basis . . . embraced in 
national law in many countries of the world,”66 including England, 
Germany, France, China, and others.67 The Brussels I Recast also 
 63. mInsohō art. 3-7. For a general assessment, see Koji Takahashi, The 
Jurisdiction of Japanese Courts in a Comparative Context, 11 J. PrIv. Int’l l. 103 (2015).
 64. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991) (subjecting 
a contractual forum-selection clause only to scrutiny for the “fundamental fairness” of 
the forum selected and ignoring the adhesive status of the contract or the burden on 
the consumer to litigate in the forum selected by the defendant). One intriguing and 
looming wrinkle on U.S. consent doctrine involves state attempts to extract consent to 
general jurisdiction through business-registration statutes. The Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws adopts this position, see restatement (second) oF conFlIct oF laws 
§ 44 (am. law Inst. 1971), and the caselaw holds analogous support, see, e.g., Hess 
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (extracted consent to specific jurisdiction under 
a nonresident motorist statute). Some lower courts have held that the strong form of 
consent applies to registration statutes too. See 4A charles alan wrIght et al., Federal 
PractIce and Procedure § 1069.2 n.25 (4th ed. 2017) (collecting cases). For expres-
sions of skepticism, see Dodson, supra note 27, at 84; Tanya J. Monestier, Registration 
Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 cardozo l. rev. 1343, 
1346 (2015).
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 20–24.
 66. Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a 
Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 s.c. l. rev. 591, 593 (2012).
 67. Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶ 3-1(9); 
straFProzessordnung [zPo] [code oF cIvIl Procedure] § 32 (Ger.); code de Procédure 
cIvIle [c.P.c.] [cIvIl Procedure code] art. 46 (Fr.); Interpretation No. 5 of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2015, effective Feb. 4, 2015), arts. 
24–25, CLI.3.242703(EN) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter SPC Interpretation 
No. 5]. A potential exception is Canada, which recently declined to endorse a firm rule 
of personal jurisdiction based on place of injury. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 89. For exposition of Van Breda, see Tanya J. Monestier, 
(Still) a “Real and Substantial” Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 Fordham 
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adopts this principle,68 as do more specific international projects.69 
However, the Court’s recent decisions have narrowed specific juris-
diction in several ways that depart from what many other countries 
would tend to allow.70 For example, Nicastro and Walden disclaimed 
that the place of injury was enough to satisfy personal jurisdiction 
in a tort case. Justice Ginsburg, in her Nicastro dissent, pointedly 
contrasted Nicastro’s more restrictive view with the trends and ap-
proaches elsewhere in the world.71
In addition, U.S. law’s marginalization of the plaintiff ’s connec-
tion to the forum is contrary to a foreign trend to allow adjudicatory 
jurisdiction in the plaintiff ’s home state under certain circumstances. 
Although most countries consider personal jurisdiction based solely 
on the plaintiff ’s nationality to be exorbitant,72 they typically allow 
personal jurisdiction in the plaintiff ’s home country in certain cir-
cumstances (usually for consumer contracts) that would not be per-
mitted under U.S. law.73 For example, the Brussels I Recast allows an 
EU-domiciled consumer to sue a provider in the consumer’s domicile 
state, and the provider can only sue an EU-domiciled consumer in 
the consumer’s domicile state.74 Swiss law allows Swiss consumers to 
 68. Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 7.2 (providing for jurisdiction “in mat-
ters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful 
event occurred or may occur”). Interestingly, the 2019 Judgments Convention focuses 
on where the act or omission that causes injury took place, not on where the injury was 
suffered. 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.1(j) (providing for recogni-
tion of a judgment when “the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation arising 
from death, physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, and the act or omis-
sion directly causing such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of where 
that harm occurred”).
 69. See, e.g., erIk Jayme & symeon c. symeonIdes, eIghth comm’n, Inst. oF Int’l law, 
Internet and the InFrIngement oF PrIvacy: Issues oF JurIsdIctIon, aPPlIcaBle law and 
enForcement oF ForeIgn Judgments arts. 2.1, 5 (2019) (providing for jurisdiction in the 
“home state of the person who suffered or may suffer an injury” arising from injuries 
caused through the use of the Internet to a person’s rights of personality, unless the 
defendant demonstrates that “it did not derivate any pecuniary or other significant 
benefit from the accessibility of the material in the forum State” and that “a reasonable 
person could not have foreseen that the material would be accessible [or] cause injury 
in that State”).
 70. I should point out that other countries do not use the term “specific jurisdic-
tion” (or “general jurisdiction”) as the United States has adopted. However, most coun-
tries do recognize the two species of case-linked and case-independent jurisdiction that 
“specific” and “general” roughly refer to.
 71. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909 & n.16 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).
 72. See text accompanying note 57. France appears to be the exception, see c.P.c. 
art. 14 (jurisdiction in France over nonresidents for “obligations” to a French person), 
but perhaps only when no other basis of jurisdiction can be used, see oscar chase 
et al., cIvIl lItIgatIon In comParatIve context 654 (2d ed. 2017). For a discussion, see 
Clermont & Palmer, supra note 57, at 487–99.
 73. Silberman, supra note 66, at 611 (“[The U.S.] focus on the forum’s connection 
to the defendant . . . make[s] it impossible in the United States to [allow] creditors or 
consumers to sue at home—as many other jurisdictional regimes permit.”).
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bring their claims in courts located at their domicile.75 And Chinese 
law allows certain internet-based torts to give rise to personal juris-
diction in China over a nonresident tortfeasor where the plaintiff is 
domiciled or where the plaintiff accessed the information.76 By con-
trast, U.S. personal jurisdiction is adamant that the plaintiff ’s connec-
tions to the forum are relevant only to the extent they create a direct 
link between the defendant and the forum. The U.S. refusal to accom-
modate certain plaintiffs’ interests in home-state litigation demon-
strates U.S. doctrine’s more pointed focus on the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum.77
D. General Jurisdiction
In contrast to U.S. trends in specific jurisdiction, which have dis-
tanced the United States from foreign trends, the U.S. trends in gen-
eral jurisdiction have brought the United States more in line with the 
rest of the world. Most other countries have long considered “doing 
business” general jurisdiction to be exorbitant,78 and that conception 
of general jurisdiction caused tension between the United States and 
other countries during the 1990s attempt to develop a judgments con-
vention.79 But the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent general jurisdiction 
cases eliminate “doing business” jurisdiction and significantly narrow 
general jurisdiction essentially to where the defendant is “at home.”80
This U.S. trend moves toward the approach followed in other coun-
tries. The Brussels I Recast and most countries permit general juris-
diction in the defendant’s country of domicile.81 And most jurisdictions 
 75. BundesBlatt [PrIvate InternatIonal law statute] Dec. 18, 1987, I 5-60, 
art. 114(a) (Switz.).
 76. See SPC Interpretation No. 5, art. 25; Interpretation No. 20 of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Law in Hearing Civil Dispute Cases Involving 
Infringement of the Right of Dissemination on Information Networks (issued by the 
Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 17, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art. 15, CLI.3.191740(EN) 
(Lawinfochina). Chinese courts have upheld such exercises of jurisdiction even when 
the defendant does not actively target the forum (unlike, say, someone who sends an 
e-mail to a recipient in a particular forum). E.g., Mai Jai v. Apple Inc. & iTunes S.a.r.l., 
No. 5279 (Beijing Intermediate People’s Ct. Apr. 23, 2013) (exercising jurisdiction 
over nonresidents Apple and iTunes based on a Chinese plaintiff ’s iTunes download, 
in Beijing, of works that infringed her copyright). For a discussion, see Jie (Jeanne) 
Huang, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Location of a Server: Chinese Territorialism 
in the Internet Era?, 36 wIs. Int’l l.J. 87, 94 (2019).
 77. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014). To be clear, the plaintiff ’s interests 
are relevant when considering the fairness factors, but they are irrelevant when as-
sessing the minimum contacts the defendant has with the forum.
 78. chase et al., supra note 72, at 673.
 79. Burbank, supra note 57, at 119.
 80. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 147 (2014).
 81. See, e.g., Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 4.1 (domicile); straFProzess-
ordnung [zPo] [code oF cIvIl Procedure] §§ 12–13 (Ger.) (residence); code de Procédure 
cIvIle [c.P.c.] [cIvIl Procedure code] arts. 42–43 (Fr.) (for individuals, where domiciled 
or, if no domicile, where resident; for corporations, where the corporation is estab-
lished); mInJI mInsohō [mInsohō] [c. cIv. Pro.] 1996, art. 3-2, § 1 (Japan) (for individ-
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define the domicile of businesses to be where they have their “statu-
tory seat,” “central administration,” or “principal place of business,” or 
where “incorporated or formed.”82 This standard is close to the U.S. “at 
home” standard, with its “paradigm” illustrations of place of incorpor-
ation and principal place of business.83 Indeed, in Daimler, the Court 
noted that one justification for narrowing general jurisdiction was to 
bring U.S. personal jurisdiction more in line with other countries.84
However, it appears that U.S. general jurisdiction now is actu-
ally narrower than that of many other countries because U.S. general 
jurisdiction more rigidly resists exceptions to domicile-based general 
jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to broaden general 
jurisdiction beyond the paradigm examples except in extraordinary 
cases, such as when a foreign corporation wholly relocates its oper-
ations temporarily to a state.85 But other countries’ formulations of 
general jurisdiction permit more relaxed exceptions. In Germany, for 
example, individuals’ place of long-term but temporary abode (such as 
for students and certain workers) may qualify for general jurisdiction 
for claims under property law.86 In Japan, if no business office can be 
located, general jurisdiction is appropriate if a representative of the 
business is domiciled in Japan.87 In China, an individual not domi-
ciled in China is subject to general jurisdiction in China if they have 
resided there for twelve consecutive months.88
These approaches reflect a more functional doctrine of general 
jurisdiction that incorporates sensitivity to the fairness to the parties 
and to the need to ensure a reasonable forum for the plaintiff. By con-
trast, U.S. general jurisdiction is more rigid and blind to its effects. As 
Justice Sotomayor has pointed out, the rigidity of U.S. general juris-
diction means that
a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a 
foreign hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate will 
be unable to hold the hotel to account in a single U.S. court, 
even if the hotel company has a massive presence in mul-
tiple States. . . . Similarly, a U.S. business that enters into a 
SI 1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶ 3.1(1). The Judgments Convention recognizes judg-
ment enforcement when the underlying judgment was issued by a court located in the 
defendant’s place of “habitual residence.” 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4, 
art. 5.1(a).
 82. See, e.g., Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 63.1; 2019 Judgments 
Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.2. See also ZPO § 17(1) (defining residence of a busi-
ness at its “registered seat” and “administrative center”); mInsohō art. 3-2, § 3 (prin-
cipal office or principal place of business); SPC Interpretation No. 5, art. 3 (where an 
organization has its “principal office”).
 83. Silberman, supra note 66, at 608.
 84. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 141–42.
 85. Id.
 86. zPo § 20.
 87. mInsohō art. 3-2, § 3.
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contract in a foreign country to sell its products to a multi-
national company there may be unable to seek relief in any 
U.S. court if the multinational company breaches the con-
tract, even if that company has considerable operations in 
numerous U.S. forums. . . . Indeed, the majority’s approach 
would preclude the plaintiffs in these examples from seeking 
recourse anywhere in the United States even if no other ju-
dicial system was available to provide relief. I cannot agree 
with the majority’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause 
requires these results.89
E. Pendent Jurisdiction
In the United States, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s implicit rejection of 
pendent jurisdiction in the single-defendant context—when one claim 
satisfies personal jurisdiction but another otherwise would not—is in-
consistent with many other countries’ adoption of pendent jurisdiction 
in the multidefendant context. The Brussels I Recast allows pendent 
jurisdiction over EU domiciliaries in any member state where one 
defendant is domiciled if the claims are related.90 Many other coun-
tries’ domestic laws allow pendent personal jurisdiction over multiple 
defendants when the claims are closely connected.91 These differ-
ences relate to the underlying features of personal jurisdiction. In the 
United States, personal jurisdiction is a defendant-by-defendant in-
quiry designed to protect each defendant from its own individualized 
burdens. In Europe, by contrast, personal jurisdiction is used to facili-
tate joinder for efficiency and consistency purposes.
F. Theoretical Bases
As Linda Silberman has noted, looking at personal jurisdiction 
developments can “reveal[] the different values reflected in other sys-
tems’ jurisdictional rules.”92 U.S. personal jurisdiction once seemed 
settled on the foundation of due process notions of fairness and reason-
ableness, but recent cases have disparaged notions of fairness93 and 
have reinvigorated the idea that personal jurisdiction helps manage 
 89. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
 90. Brussels I Recast, supra note 57, art. 8(1) (providing for jurisdiction “in the 
courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so 
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”). Interestingly, 
the 2019 Judgments Convention does not mention pendent jurisdiction.
 91. See, e.g., Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, Practice Dir. 6B, ¶¶ 3-1(3)(b), 
3-1(4); mInsohō art. 3-6. One exception is Germany. See Peter l. murray & rolF 
stürner, german cIvIl JustIce 517 (2004).
 92. Silberman, supra note 66, at 592.
 93. See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) 
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sovereign prerogatives.94 The splintered decision in Nicastro confirms 
that the theoretical basis of personal jurisdiction remains unsettled 
in the United States. By contrast, European notions of jurisdiction to 
adjudicate are more firmly established and focus on different aims. 
The Brussels I Recast was designed “to lower costs by increasing cer-
tainty and diminishing procedural delays; improve access to justice, 
especially for weaker parties; and create better coordination of legal 
proceedings.”95 The Choice of Court Convention was premised on 
the idea that personal jurisdiction should lead to “enhanced judicial 
co-operation” in furtherance of “international trade and investment.”96 
And the 2019 Judgments Convention reiterates the international-
trade rationale and adds the desire to “promote effective access to 
justice for all.”97 The emphases on justice “for all” and inter-sovereign 
“co-operation” and “coordination” are quite different from the recent 
U.S. emphases on the protection of defendants from the burdens of 
litigation and the need to police inter-sovereign friction.
III. oBservatIons on Personal JurIsdIctIon In the unIted states
U.S. exceptionalism in personal jurisdiction has frustrated the 
formation of a multinational agreement on personal jurisdiction that 
includes the United States. That is not for a lack of interest on the 
part of the United States. To the contrary, the United States long 
sought such a mechanism to facilitate the enforcement of U.S. judg-
ments abroad. The United States even initiated the effort, in the late 
1990s, to design a worldwide convention on personal jurisdiction.98 
But other countries objected to some of the broader facets of U.S. per-
sonal jurisdiction, especially the “doing business” jurisdiction seem-
ingly sanctioned by the Supreme Court prior to Goodyear.99 At the 
time, U.S. scholars involved in the project thought it “probably too late 
in the day” for the Court to scale back general jurisdiction based on 
“substantial business systematically and continuously” conducted in 
 94. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (“As 
we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction are more than a guarantee of im-
munity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial 
limitations on the power of the respective States.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
 95. chase et al., supra note 72, at 646.
 96. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 59, pmbl.
 97. 2019 Judgments Convention, supra note 4, pmbl.
 98. Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Georges 
Droz, Sec’y Gen., the Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed 
with Hague Conference Document L.C. ON No. 15 (92)).
 99. Silberman, supra note 66, at 614 (“The expansive interpretations of doing 
business jurisdiction in the United States have been a source of criticism abroad. . . . In 
the recent negotiations for a world-wide jurisdiction and judgments convention at the 
Hague Conference, efforts were made to curtail that type of jurisdiction by placing it 
on the prohibited list. The United States objected, and this was one of the issues over 
which the Hague negotiations broke down.”). See also Linda Silberman, Comparative 
Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments 
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a U.S. state.100 The judgments project stalled and was repackaged in 
a far more limited form,101 ultimately resulting in the Choice of Court 
Convention that was adopted in 2005 (though still not ratified by the 
United States).
The judgments project was reconstituted in 2011 and resulted 
in the adoption of the 2019 Judgments Convention. With the United 
States having dispensed with “doing business” general jurisdiction, 
and with general jurisdiction’s “at home” test looking a lot more like 
general jurisdiction in other countries,102 it is not fantastical to hope 
that the United States might be inclined to ratify the convention. 
That hope is supported by recent statements in the Court’s opinions 
comparing the U.S. doctrine with that of other countries. Although 
U.S. procedure remains internally focused,103 those acknowledgments 
indicate that the Court is at least taking note of international views 
in ways that may be influential down the road.
But significant convergence remains unlikely, for three reasons. 
First, major areas of disagreement remain. Tag jurisdiction has deep 
historical ties, and the United States shows no signs of relinquishing 
it. The strong form of consent, without relaxation for unequal bar-
gaining power, is inconsistent with recent trends in other countries. 
The recent narrowing of specific jurisdiction in the United States—es-
pecially without regard to the plaintiff ’s connections to the forum and 
disavowal of the place of injury as appropriate for personal jurisdiction 
in a tort case—suggest a trend away from the laws of other countries, 
as does the move to make general jurisdiction rigid. Pendent juris-
diction regarding multiple parties seems all but dead in the United 
States, despite its enhancement of efficiency, as other countries recog-
nize. Yes, some movement has been toward the rest of the world. But 
there is a long way to go for more comprehensive overlap.
Second, the underlying rationales make justifications for par-
allelism difficult. Europe views personal jurisdiction as about inter-
sovereign cooperation, efficiency and convenience, and fairness to all. 
The United States, by contrast, continues to struggle to articulate a 
clear theoretical foundation for personal jurisdiction and has vacil-
lated between reasonableness, fairness focused on the individual 
rights of each defendant, and protection of state sovereignty and al-
leviation of inter-sovereign frictions. It is difficult to imagine these 
origin points generating similar doctrines.
 100. Burbank, supra note 57, at 119.
 101. For a discussion, see David Goddard, Rethinking the Judgments Convention—A 
Pacific Perspective, 3 y.B. PrIv. Int’l l. 27 (2001).
 102. Silberman, supra note 66, at 613.
 103. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 
50 am. J. comP. l. 277, 278 (2002); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards in a Comparative 
Context, 158 u. Pa. l. rev. 441, 442, 446 (2010); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American 
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Third, the United States is hampered mechanistically. Personal 
jurisdiction in most civil law countries, and even in many common law 
countries, is a creature of code and convention, which can be created 
all at once with inter-sovereign compromises in mind and clear rules 
set out in the codified language. Personal jurisdiction in the United 
States, meanwhile, is developed primarily by case-by-case decisions 
from the Supreme Court,104 whose decision making is heavily influ-
enced by U.S. precedent, American-style litigation,105 history and trad-
ition, federalism, and constitutional rights. It is true that the common 
law process has titrated the broad standards of U.S. personal juris-
diction into some settled rule-like applications, but those applications 
have tended to deviate from global analogues. Theoretically, Congress 
or the Rules Committees could step in to expand or contract personal 
jurisdiction in federal court without regard to state boundaries or 
interstate concerns, even creating a reticulated and specific regime 
akin to the Brussels I Recast. But neither Congress nor the Rules 
Committees has shown interest or political will in taking on such a 
project.106
All this means that U.S. personal jurisdiction is likely to evolve in 
unpredictable ways in the near term and seems more likely to follow 
an independent track rather than hew to foreign norms. Some areas 
of parallelism might still occur, but substantial convergence is likely 
to remain elusive.
Still, there is a silver lining. Comparativism is not all about con-
vergence. One benefit is enrichment to better understand, and critique, 
home systems.107 Global perspectives also confirm civil procedure’s 
“universality.”108 The benefit is particularly important for law stu-
dents,109 and comparativism in American civil procedure courses is 
on the rise.110 Comparative personal jurisdiction seems ripe for closer 
scrutiny in American classrooms. Further, the benefit is not limited 
to students: “Advocates, advisers, and judges must have at least a 
working knowledge of foreign procedures to be able to frame, antici-
pate, or decide legal issues that cross national boundaries.”111 And 
 104. Codified rules do have a role to play in subconstitutional contours of U.S. per-
sonal jurisdiction, but the focus has always been on the constitutional contours as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court.
 105. U.S. procedural exceptionalism and litigation culture means that issues of 
personal jurisdiction crop up in varied places, especially in aggregate litigation, where 
the issues become both contentious and politicized. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 6 (ex-
ploring the applicability of personal jurisdiction to plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation 
cases); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) (applying personal juris-
diction to unnamed class members).
 106. Dodson, supra note 27, at 83–84.
 107. Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating Transnational Perspectives into Civil 
Procedure: What Not to Teach, 56 J. legal educ. 524, 525 (2006); Scott Dodson, The 
Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 ala. l. rev. 133, 138 (2008).
 108. James E. Pfander, Book Review, 56 am. J. comP. l. 506, 509 (2008).
 109. Id. at 508.
 110. Id. at 507.
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academic research provides these benefits to scholars too,112 whose 
comparative study can enrich understanding and debate in academic 
circles.113 For these reasons, comparative approaches to personal jur-
isdiction offer promising opportunities for cross-border research and 
education.
conclusIon
This Article has aimed to study U.S. personal jurisdiction in a com-
parative context, revealing both the similarities and convergences and 
the differences and divergences. That comparison, in turn, has high-
lighted the different theoretical and systemic foundations at work be-
hind the doctrine. Those differences may continue to present obstacles 
to large-scale convergence. But studying them nevertheless has its 
own benefits, as this Article strives to attest.
 112. See John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United 
States, 43 am. J. comP. l. 545, 545 (1995).
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